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APOPLECTIC ABOUT HYPERLEXIS
William D. Araiza*
Mila Sohoni’s article, The Idea of Too Much Law, 1 provides a broad
examination of “the hyperlexis critique”—in plain English, the claim that
there is too much law, especially federal law. This brief response begins
with some observations about Sohoni’s taxonomy of hyperlexis claims. It
then offers a different, more narrative-based approach to the hyperlexis
critique. It concludes by suggesting that this alternate perspective may help
provide substance to a critique that, as Sohoni correctly observes, is both
difficult to pin down and thus engage, yet profoundly corrosive of the
legitimacy of our regulatory system.
I. SOHONI’S CRITIQUE
After an introduction suggesting that all three federal branches have
acknowledged a concern about hyperlexis,2 Sohoni moves on to discuss
various “accounts” 3 of hyperlexis. Her “accounts,” however, reveal an
ambiguity in her argument. At times it is unclear whether Sohoni’s
accounts focus on hyperlexis itself, or on dynamics that in turn generate
hyperlexis. For example, she notes arguments that federal laws are either
too numerous or complex, claims that directly address hyperlexis. 4 She
then considers claims that Congress habitually exceeds its enumerated
powers or delegates too much authority to administrative agencies.5 Unlike
the numerosity and complexity claims, these latter arguments implicate
hyperlexis only tangentially. She then considers another direct hyperlexis
claim—the argument that regulations are too costly. 6 After considering
these arguments’ implications, Sohoni ends with a “counsel of despair”7
that no principled critique can zero in on how one decides whether there is
in fact too much law, coupled with the warning that the prevalence of the
critique undermines faith in government.

* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Thanks to Mila Sohoni for the opportunity to
respond to her thought-provoking article, and to Sara Bernstein and Kristie LaSalle for fine
research assistance.
1. 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1585 (2012).
2. See id. at 1586–91.
3. Id. at 1601–22.
4. See id. at 1602–10.
5. See id. at 1610–14.
6. See id. at 1614–22.
7. Id. at 1631.
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As suggested above, Sohoni’s taxonomy of arguments is somewhat
confusing. The numerosity, complexity, and cost arguments reflect direct
claims of hyperlexis—arguments that, respectively, federal law is too
verbose, complex, and expensive. By contrast, the federalism and
delegation arguments implicate hyperlexis only indirectly, through claims
that, respectively, congressional over-stepping of the federal-state balance
and over-delegation to regulatory agencies create conditions in which
hyperlexis can occur. While not a critical flaw in Sohoni’s argument, this
conflation of direct and indirect causes makes it harder to focus
methodically on the hyperlexis phenomenon.
This confusion may reflect a deeper issue with Sohoni’s method. She
considers the hyperlexis critique as an abstract matter—hence her focus on
concepts such as numerosity and complexity. So understood, she is correct
to find that critique lacking. But abstract “accounts” of hyperlexis do not
reflect the phenomenon as it is actually experienced. Perhaps hyperlexis,
like obscenity, can only be identified when one sees it.8 If so, we may
make more progress by reasoning from actual stories that implicate
hyperlexis anxiety.
This response suggests that scholars examine the hyperlexis critique at a
more granular level, focusing on popular perceptions rather than
abstractions. After all, if the hyperlexis critique flows fundamentally from
such perceptions, 9 then investigating those perceptions may better reveal
the nature of the concerns. In turn, that information may enable a more
satisfying response.
II. ONE EXAMPLE OF HYPERLEXIS ANXIETY: MEET THE SACKETTS
As one hyperlexis narrative, consider the story told by Chantell and
Michael Sackett, the plaintiffs in Sackett v. EPA. 10 Their story, involving
the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) administration of the Clean
Water Act, constitutes the nightmare scenario—or perhaps one such
scenario 11—of those who worry about hyperlexis. In 2007, the Sacketts
began building a home on a residential homesite they owned in an Idaho
subdivision. The site was surrounded by homes and roads and otherwise
indistinguishable from sites on which others had built single-family
homes—the zoned use of the property. Nevertheless, late that year, the
EPA issued the Sacketts a compliance order under the Clean Water Act,
alleging that their property contained wetlands, ordering them to stop
construction and remediate the wetlands damage their construction caused,
and requiring them to allow EPA access to the parcel and documents
8. Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I shall
not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be [obscenity] . . . .
But I know it when I see it . . . .”).
9. See Sohoni, supra note 1, at 1586–87 (noting complaints about hyperlexis in the
popular press and among political commentators).
10. 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012).
11. See infra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing another scenario that may
implicate hyperlexis fears).
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relating to it. The order warned that they were liable for fines of up to
$75,000 for each day of non-compliance. When the Sacketts sought
judicial review of the order, the Ninth Circuit held that the statute precluded
pre-enforcement review. Thus, judicial review would have to await EPA’s
decision to bring an enforcement action against them—a decision EPA
might never make. 12
The question before the Supreme Court was not the merits of the order—
i.e., whether the Sacketts’ property contained wetlands—but rather the
availability of pre-enforcement review. The Court’s unanimous answer,
that such review was available, 13 was couched in the dry, technical jargon
of the Administrative Procedure Act—mostly. 14 But most relevant for our
purposes is the tenor of the Sacketts’ factual narrative. Their brief opens
with the following sentence: “The Clean Water Act casts a nationwide
regulatory net that snags individual citizens doing ordinary, everyday
activities.” 15 The theme that the statute imposes unanticipated (indeed,
unanticipatable) liabilities echoes through the rest of their fact statement.
Thus, the brief states that “Michael and Chantall Sackett are individual
citizens unwittingly ensnared in this regulatory net.” 16 Not only were they
performing “ordinary, everyday activities,” 17 but their legal violation could
not have been reasonably foreseen: the brief observed that “[w]etlands
are . . . defined by complex criteria . . . which defy consistent application
and are not apparent to the average citizen.”18 Nor did anyone warn them
that their conduct was close to a legal danger zone: “The Sacketts had
obtained no information that gave them any reason to believe that their
property contained ‘wetlands’ regulated under the Clean Water Act. They
obtained all required local permits . . . .”19
The Sacketts’ legal argument about pre-enforcement review was, strictly
speaking, distinct from this narrative. But the unavailability of that review
was no mere technical flaw. Rather, adding legal force to their overregulation narrative, the unavailability of judicial review trapped the
Sacketts in a regulatory house of mirrors, where penalties accumulated
daily for failure to comply with an administrative order alleging a
regulatory violation the judicial review of which could only be triggered by

12. See Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1369–73.
13. Id. at 1374 (finding that the compliance order constituted “final agency action” for
purposes of judicial review, and that the Clean Water Act did not preclude such review).
14. But see id. at 1375 (Alito, J., concurring) (“The position taken in this case by the
Federal Government . . . would have put the property rights of ordinary Americans entirely
at the mercy of [EPA] employees.”); id. (“And if the owners want their day in court to show
that their lot does not include covered wetlands, well, as a practical matter, that is just too
bad.”); id. (“In a nation that values due process, not to mention private property, such
treatment is unthinkable.”).
15. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Sacket, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (No. 10-1062), 2011 WL 4500687,
at *7.
16. Id. at 6.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 4.
19. Id. at 6.
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the agency itself when—and if—it decided to bring an enforcement action.
Too much law, indeed.
III. HYPERLEXIS RECONSIDERED
In her article, Sohoni concludes that hyperlexis claims lack principled
foundations, and thus cannot furnish the basis for a serious critique of our
regulatory regime. I believe she is correct: abstract critiques of hyperlexis
suffer from either logical flaws or the impossibility of establishing a
coherent measurement metric. One might cavil with her analysis here and
there. For example, Sohoni is probably too cavalier when she assumes that
a tougher non-delegation doctrine would simply cause Congress to find new
vehicles for enacting the same regulation.20 One reason Congress finds
regulation attractive is exactly that the looseness of current non-delegation
doctrine allows it to legislate at low cost. Congress’s use of vague statutory
language allows legislators both to achieve compromise and avoid taking
heat for particular policies while taking credit for “doing something” about
the given problem. 21 But these are minor objections. Overall, she is right
to conclude that “critiques of hyperlexis are difficult to operationalize
individually [and] their cross-cutting ramifications make them impossible to
operationalize in concert.” 22 She is also correct that accounts from
democratic process breakdowns are “elusive.” 23
By contrast, the Sacketts’ framing of their case provides insight—if only
impressionistic—into the root complaints about hyperlexis. The Sacketts
portrayed themselves as “individual citizens doing ordinary, everyday
activities,” when they were “unwittingly ensnared” in the Clean Water
Act’s “nationwide regulatory net.” 24 As explained earlier, their legal
argument addressed the lack of judicial review of the compliance order that
ensnared them, not the scope or depth of the net per se. These two facets of
this case, however, combined to create a situation that led Justice Alito to
ask the EPA’s lawyer at oral argument, “[I]f you related the facts of this
case as they come to us to an ordinary homeowner, don’t you think most
ordinary homeowners would say this kind of thing can’t happen in the
United States?” 25
What about the Sacketts’ story made Justice Alito so incredulous? In the
colloquy in which his question appeared, he painted a picture of the
Sacketts’ plight:

20. See Sohoni, supra note 1, at 1613–14.
21. See, e.g., Daniel B. Rodriguez, Statutory Interpretation and Political Advantage, 12
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 217, 218 (1992) (credit-taking); Sandra B. Zellmer, The Devil, the
Details, and the Dawn of the 21st Century Administrative State: Beyond the New Deal, 32
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 941, 955 (2000) (compromise).
22. Sohoni, supra note 1, at 1622.
23. Id. at 1624.
24. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 15, at 4, 6.
25. Transcript of Oral Argument at 37, Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012) (No. 101062).
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You . . . buy property to build a house. You think maybe there’s a little
drainage problem in part of your lot. So, you start to build the house, and
then you get an order from the EPA which says: You have filled in
wetlands; so, you can’t build your house. Remove the fill, put in all kinds
of plants, and now you have to let us on your premises whenever we want
to. You have to turn over to us all sorts of documents, and for every day
that you don’t do all this, you’re accumulating a potential fine of $75,000.
And, by the way, there’s no way you can go to court to challenge our
determination that this is a wetlands until such time as we choose to sue
you. 26

Justice Alito might as well have been paraphrasing the Sacketts’ selfnarrative. Add in the lack of prompt judicial review of the agency’s
determination, and one can understand Justice Alito’s exclamation in his
concurring opinion: “unthinkable.” 27
This description illustrates one variation of hyperlexis, what we can call
the “lightning bolt.” In this scenario, law reaches so broadly, deeply, and
unpredictably that it traps individuals doing things they would never expect
to trigger legal liability. So understood, the hyperlexis critique comes into
focus: the problem in this scenario is not too many laws, or overly
expensive or even complex laws, but laws that prohibit innocuous conduct
that normal, law-abiding citizens engage in every day.
This understanding of hyperlexis eases some of the analytical difficulties
Sohoni identifies. For example, she rightly notes that determining the
complexity of a legal rule is itself quite difficult, thus rendering unhelpful
what she calls “the Argument from Complexity.”28 Is a terse but vague tort
rule (such as, “don’t be negligent”) more complex than detailed regulations
governing how one acts in the world? Sohoni rightly notes the elusiveness
of a principled answer to that question, as well as to questions about
numerosity and costs. But the lightning bolt critique of hyperlexis points at
a different inquiry: whether in some fundamental way it is unanticipated
that certain conduct will trigger legal liability. 29
As befits a generalized public anxiety about law, this critique finds
expression in both popular imagination and legal doctrine. As to the
former, we know of the Stalin-era fear of the midnight knock on the door,
the sign that you have done something to get on the secret police’s list.
Straddling public imagination and legal doctrine is the narrative of
landowners finding themselves suddenly subject to all the restrictions of the
Endangered Species Act (ESA) when a single animal, usually an
insignificant or humorous-sounding one, is found scurrying across one’s

26. Id. at 37–38.
27. See Sackett, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1375 (Alito, J., concurring); supra note 14.
28. Sohoni, supra note 1, at 1607.
29. Indeed, Sohoni cites Richard Epstein’s argument that legal complexity comprises the
degree to which a legal rule “has pervasive application across routine social activities.” Id.
(quoting RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 29 (1995)). As
explained in the text, my argument goes beyond mere pervasive application, to consider the
degree to which enforcement of such a rule can be perceived as arbitrary.
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property. 30 At the other extreme of seriousness are the views of Supreme
Court justices who voted to invalidate the death penalty because it was
imposed so arbitrarily. 31 What unites these examples is the freakishness of
the liability imposed: you did something—who knows what?—to get your
name on the secret police list, a “hapless toad” happened to crawl across
your property, or you happened to be the one murder defendant out of a
hundred whose jury decided on death.
But the lightning bolt critique implicates more than simple freakishness.
It also reflects anxiety about the breadth and depth of the law, which
ensures that any citizen, doing any commonplace thing, might be struck at
any time. Anyone—not just a political opponent or a convicted murderer—
is subject to the lightning bolt.32 Thus, this critique also implies a public
intuition about what conduct is legitimate, as encompassed in the Sacketts’
self-description as “individual citizens doing ordinary, everyday
activities.” 33
Under this critique, it is irrelevant whether tort liability is imposed via a
“simple” common law rule or a “complex” set of regulations. Everyone
understands that if you act carelessly, you may be sued. But nobody thinks
that building a house in a residential subdivision risks liability. Everyone
does it. It is innocent conduct. How can it be wrong? And if it is wrong,
then something is wrong with the law. If anyone can be snagged by a
regulatory net when simply minding her own business, then that net must be
too wide.
CONCLUSION: HYPERLEXIS FROM THE GROUND UP
The Sacketts’ narrative complements Sohoni’s more abstract
investigation of hyperlexis. It translates anxiety about hyperlexis as anxiety
about arbitrary thunderbolts of liability hurled down (in particular, from
afar) to strike innocent people engaging in innocuous activities. True or
not, the story of a couple doing what many Americans do every day (and
what many would like to do) when they were suddenly accosted by faraway
30. See, e.g., Rancho Viejo LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(Roberts, J., dissenting from rehearing en banc) (describing “the taking [under the ESA] of a
hapless toad, that for reasons of its own, lives its entire life in California”); Laura J.
Hendrickson, Coverage of the Endangered Species Act in Four Major Newspapers, 45 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 135, 162 (2005) (discussing this phenomenon).
31. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 293–95 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); id.
at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
32. Cf. EPSTEIN, supra note 29, at 29 (“The criminal law of homicide . . . provides its
own safe harbor: don’t kill anyone. In contrast, the rules regulating the use of property or
the hiring and firing of workers, or even the selling of products or the buying and selling of
companies, provide no similar haven. Rather these rules routinely intrude into the lives of
ordinary productive people, and are not directed to the destructive activities of a very small
portion of the population. For my purposes at least, a complex rule is one that . . . has
pervasive application across routine social activities, and is not directed solely to the
dangerous activities of people who live at the margins of society. Legal complexity is not
merely a simple measure of the inherent or formal properties of legal rules. It is also a
function of how deeply they cut into the fabric of ordinary life.”).
33. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 15, at 4.
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bureaucrats and slapped with massive unreviewable daily fines seems
“unthinkable.” 34 The violent disabusal of their intuition that they were
doing nothing even remotely wrong surely engenders suspicion that maybe
there is too much law. The resonance of their story35 suggests that, at least
in the popular mind, there may in fact be something to the hyperlexis
critique.
The Sacketts’ story does not reflect the only plausible version of
hyperlexis anxiety. For example, one might also tell stories of businesses
suffering under comically paternalistic over-regulation, as when Ronald
Reagan famously claimed that Occupational Health and Safety
Administration (OSHA) had issued over 100 rules addressing how to climb
a ladder. 36 That hyperlexis critique is different from the one implied by the
Sacketts’ story. One can easily frame other narratives as well.
The ultimate point is that Sohoni’s failure to find rubrics that “identify,
measure, and critique” 37 the hyperlexis phenomenon calls for a more
inductive approach that understands the hyperlexis critique as taking shape
from individual stories. By examining those stories, we may develop a
more helpful taxonomy of hyperlexis complaints based on substantive
categories (for example, the thunderbolt story) rather than abstract
explanations such as numerosity and over-delegation. These more
informative categories may help us better identify the scope of any actual
hyperlexis problem. If the stories reveal a non-existent problem, or one not
flowing from anything identifiable as hyperlexis, then scholars may be able
to rebut the claim and thus blunt what Sohoni correctly identifies as the
corrosive force the hyperlexis claim exerts on our governmental
institutions. 38 And if those complaints do suggest real hyperlexis, they can
be resolved on their own terms, and not through blunderbuss approaches
such as the generally ill-conceived regulatory reform proposals currently
pending in Congress. 39

34. Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1375 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
35. For one example of how the popular media viewed the Sacketts’ case, see ‘Little
Guy’ Wins High Court Fight over Property Rights, CNN (Mar. 21, 2012),
http://articles.cnn.com/2012-03-21/us/us_scotus-property-rights_1_property-rights-highcourt-clean-water-act?_s=PM:US.
36. See, e.g., Robert Stiff, A Battle Best Not Waged, EVENING INDEP., May 1980, at 1A.
According to this source, Reagan’s claim was false.
37. Sohoni, supra note 1, at 1601.
38. See id. at 1628–31.
39. See id. at 1592–94 (discussing these proposals); William D. Araiza, Regulatory
Changes, Part 3: Curbing Independent Agencies’ Independence(?), PRAWFSBLAWG (Nov.
30, 2011, 7:23 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/11/regulatorychanges-part-3.html (same).

